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Kendall v. Pestana: Standard of
Reasonableness Applied to Commercial
Assignment Clauses
In Kendall v. Ernest Pestana, Inc.,' the California Supreme Court
considered a provision in a commercial lease requiring written con-
sent of the lessor before the lessee could assign the lease or sublet
the premises.2 The question presented was whether a lessor could
unreasonably. and arbitrarily withhold consent in the absence of a pro-
vision prohibiting the unreasonable withholding of consent.3 The court
held that when an assignment requires the prior consent of the lessor,
the lessor may not withhold consent unless a commercially reasonable
objection to the assignee or the proposed use exists.4
Part I of this Note sets forth the facts of Kendall and summarizes
the majority and dissenting opinions. Part II presents the legal
background of approval clauses with respect to leading California cases.
Part III analyzes the effect Kendall will have on existing and future
leases. Also, the probable effect Kendall will have on the statutory
remedies provided in the California Civil Code is considered. This
Note concludes that Kendall should be applied only to leases entered
into before 1971 and applied prospectively.
I. THE CASE
A. The Facts
The City of San Jose leased 14,400 square feet of hangar space
at the city-owned San Jose Municipal Airport to Irving and Janice
Perlitch. 5 The Perlitches subsequently entered into a twenty-five year
sublease with Robert Bixler. 6 The rental rate under the sublease was
to increase every ten years in the same proportion as rents increased
on the master lease with the City of San Jose. 7 Bixler intended to
1. 40 Cal. 3d 488, 709 P.2d 837, 220 Cal. Rptr. 818 (1985).
2. Although the case involved a lease assignment, the holding was extended to subleases
as well. Kendall, 40 Cal. 3d at 493 n.2, 709 P.2d at 839 n.2, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 820 n.2. This
note will omit references to subleases.
3. Kendall, 40 Cal. 3d at 493, 709 P.2d at 839, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 820.
4. Id. at 507, 709 P.2d at 849, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 830.
5. Id. at 493, 709 P.2d at 839, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 820.
6. Id.
7. Id.
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use the premises for an airplane maintenance business.8 Shortly after
contracting with Bixler, the Perlitches assigned their interest to Ernest
Pestana. Pestana became Bixler's new lessor.9
Bixler conducted the airplane maintenance business until 1981 when
he agreed to sell the business to Jack Kendall. 10 The proposed sale
of the business included the equipment, inventory, and improvements
on the property."I In addition, the sale included the existing lease which
Kendall agreed to assume. The proposed assignee, Kendall, had a
stronger financial statement and greater net worth than did the
assignor, Bixler.' 2
The lease provided that written consent of the lessor, Pestana, was
required before the lessee, Bixler, could assign the lease.' 3 A provi-
sion of the lease rendered the lease voidable at the option of the lessor
if the lessee failed to obtain consent to assignment.' 4 Pestana refused
to consent to the prop6sed assignment, claiming an absolute right
of the lessor to refuse assignment.'" The proposed assignee, Kendall,
brought suit seeking a declaration that the unreasonable refusal of
Pestana to consent to the assignment of the lease was an unlawful
restraint on alienation." In addition, Kendall alleged that Pestana
demanded increased rent and other onerous terms as a condition to
consent.' 7 In sustaining the demurrer to the complaint, the trial court
upheld the lessor's refusal to consent to the assignment.' 8
B. The Opinions
1. The Majority
The California Supreme Court reversed the order sustaining the
demurrer to the complaint.' 9 The court ruled that a commercial lease
that limits assignments or subleases to those consented to by the lessor
require that the lessor consent to assignment unless a commercially
reasonable objection exists.20 The unreasonable withholding of con-
8. Id.
9. Id. at 494, 709 P.2d at 840, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 821.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 507, 709 P.2d at 849, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 220.
20. Id. The court did not address the question of the legal effect of covenanting for the
right to withhold consent arbitrarily and capriciously. Id.
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sent was held to be a restraint on alienation and a violation of the
implied duty of good faith and fair dealing. 2
a. Restraint on Alienation
At common law, a lessor could withhold consent to an assignment
for any or no reason.22 The court noted that the impetus for the change
from the common law majority view to the rule adopted in Kendall
came from two sources. 23 First, the Kendall court recognized that the
law favors the free alienation of property. 24 The policy against restraints
on alienation pertains to leasehold interests as coveyances.25 While
restrictions on the alienability of leasehold interests are permitted, the
restrictions are strictly construed against the lessor.26 In support of
this proposition, the court cited California Civil Code section 71127
which provides that conditions restraining alienation are void when
repugnant to the interest created. 28 Restraints that result in forfeiture
are scrutinized carefully.29 The greater the restraint resulting from en-
forcement of the clause, the greater the justification must be to en-
force that clause.3"
A lessor has an undeniable interest in exercising control over the
person in possession of the lessor's property. 3' The lessor must look
to the tenant for the performance of the covenants contained in the
lease.3 2 The court, however, rejected the notion that a lessor's in-
terest in the tenant is absolute.33 Relationships between lessors and
lessees have become increasingly impersonal.34 Moreover, the lessor's
interests are protected because the original lessee remains liable to
21. Id.
22. 2 POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 246(1), at 372.97 (1985).
23. Kendall, 40 Cal. 3d at 499, 709 P.2d at 843, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 824.
24. Id. at 495, 709 P.2d at 840, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 821.
25. Id. at 499, 709 P.2d at 843, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 824.
26. Id. at 495, 709 P.2d at 840, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 821 (citing Chapman v. Great W. Gyp-
sum Co., 216 Cal. 420, 426, 14 P.2d 758, 758 (1932); ScHosmNsKi, AMERiCAN LAW OF LANDLORD
AND TENANT § 8.16, at 583-88 (1980); 2 POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 246(1), at
372.97-98 (1985)).
27. CAL. CiV. CODE § 711.
28. Id.
29. Kendall, 40 Cal. 3d at 495-96, 709 P.2d at 840-41, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 821-22.
30. Id. at 498, 709 P.2d at 843, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 824 (quoting Wellenkamp v. Bank
of America, 21 Cal. 3d 943, 949, 582 P.2d 970, 973, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379, 383 (1978)).
31. Kendall, 40 Cal. 3d at 499, 709 P.2d at 844, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 822 (quoting RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 15.2(2) (1977)).
32. Kendall, 40 Cal. 3d at 500, 709 P.2d at 844, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 822.
33. Id. at 502, 709 P.2d at 846, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 827.
34. Id. at 499, 709 P.2d at 844, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 821 (quoting 2 POWELL, POWELL ON
REAL PROPERTY § 246(1), at 372.97-.98 (1985)).
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the lessor as a surety." The original lessee remains accountable to
the lessor even if the lessor consents to the assignment and the assignee
expressly assumes the obligations of the lease. 6 After considering these
factors, the court was persuaded that a standard of reasonableness,
requiring a commercially reasonable objection to withhold consent,
sufficiently protects a lessor's interest in exercising control over the
assignment of property." A reasonableness standard also furthers the
policy favoring free alienation of property.3"
b. Good Faith and Fair Dealing
The second consideration favoring a departure from the common
law relates to the contractual aspect of a lease.39 The court recog-
nized the increasing emphasis on the duty of good faith and fair dealing
inherent in every contract. 0 This duty obligates a party empowered
with discretion to exercise that discretion in good faith.4' When a
lessor retains the discretionary power to approve or disapprove a pro-
posed assignee the decision should conform to commercially reasonable
standards. 2 This argument implicitly suggests that the parties did not
bargain for a lease provision granting the lessor absolute discretion
to approve assignments.43
c. Additional Majority Arguments
Having established affirmative grounds to support the opinion, the
court considered justifications favoring the common law rule. First,
traditional concepts of ownership and control over property placed
a lessor under no obligation to look to anyone other than the lessee
35. Id. at 500, 709 P.2d at 844, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 825 (citing Peiser v. Mettler, 50 Cal.
2d 594, 602, 328 P.2d 953, 957 (1958); Samuels v. Ottinger, 169 Cal. 209, 212, 146 P. 638,
639 (1915)).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 501, 709 P.2d at 845, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 826.
38. Id. at 499, 709 P.2d at 843, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 825.
39. Id. at 500, 709 P.2d at 844, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 825.
40. Id. (quoting Cohen v. Ratinoff, 147 Cal. App. 3d 321, 328, 195 Cal. Rptr. 84, 89 (1983)).
41. Id. at 500, 709 P.2d at 845, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 826 (quoting California Lettuce Growers
v. Union Sugar Co., 45 Cal. 2d 474, 484, 289 P.2d 785, 791 (1955)).
42. Id. at 500, 709 P.2d at 845, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 826.
43. See infra notes 68-75 and accompanying text. If two parties negotiated for the inclu-
sion of an assignment clause with knowledge that the lessor had absolute discretion to withhold
consent for any reason, the covenant of good faith and fair dealing should not supply terms
that are contrary to both the contract and the understanding of the parties. Id. See, e.g., San
Francisco Chron., Mar. 5, 1986, at - (editorial) (discussing Kendall) ("Approval clauses
have been a matter of negotiation in the past. In the future, it may not be a proper matter
for negotiation. .. ").
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for the rent." The court, however, cited the statutory obligation of
a lessor to mitigate damages if the lessee abandoned the property. "5
The lessor must mitigate damages by seeking a substitute lessee.4 6 Thus,
if the lessee abandons the premises, future rents are not always fully
recoverable from the lessee in breach. 7 Moreover, the ability of a
lessor to refuse an assignment on reasonable grounds remains, preserv-
ing valued ownership rights."
The second justification advanced in support of the common law
rule was that approval clauses are unambiguous reservations of ab-
solute discretion in the lessor. 9 The lessee could have bargained for
the addition of a reasonableness, clause.5" The court reviewed the in-
terpretations of approval clauses in a number of cases from other
jurisdictions and noted the increasing number of jurisdictions that
have rejected the common law rule. Many of these courts have held
that a lease requiring consent implicitly represents that consent will
not be unreasonably withheld."' The court adopted the implicit
reasonableness requirement as a corollary to the implied duty of good
faith and fair dealing. 52
The third argument raised in support of the common law rule was
that many leases were prepared in reliance upon the traditional rule. 3
The court responded that the reasonableness requirement should not
come as a surprise to observers of modern real property law.54 Addi-
tionally, the contractual nature of leases has been recognized in Califor-
44. Kendall, 40 Cal. 3d at 501-02, 709 P.2d at 845-46, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 826-27.
45. Id. at 502, 709 P.2d at 846, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 827. Cal. Civ. Code § 1951.4. Section
1951.4 relieves the lessor from mitigating damages if certain requirements are met. See infra
notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
46. Kendall, 40 Cal. 3d at 502, 709 P.2d at 846, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 827.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 502, 709 P.2d at 846, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 827.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 502-03, 709 P.2d at 846-47, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 827-28 (citing Granite Trust Bldg.
Corp. v. Great At. & Pac. Tel. Co., 36 F. Supp. 77, (D. Mass. 1940); Gamble v. New Orleans
Hous. Mart., Inc., 154 So. 2d 625 (La. App. 1963); Shaker Bldg. Co. v. Fed. Lime & Stone
Co., 28 Ohio Misc. 246, 277 N.E.2d 584 (1971); Fernandez v. Vasquez, 397 So. 2d 1171 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Boss Barbara, Inc. v. Newbill, 97 N.M. 239, 638 P.2d 1084 (1982)).
52. Recognizing the obligations imposed by the duty of good faith and fair dealing is
not a rewriting of the contract. Kendall, 40 Cal. 3d at 503, 709 P.2d at 847, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 828.
53. Id. at 503-04, 709 P.2d at 847, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 828.
54. "[T]he trend in favor of the minority rule should come as no surprise to observers
of the changing state of real property law in the twentieth century. The minority rule is part
of an increasing recognition of the contractual nature of leases and the implications in terms
of contractual duties that flow therefrom." Kendall, 40 Cal. 3d at 504, 709 P.2d at 847, 220
Cal. Rptr. at 828.
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nia law. s5 The majority also noted that the California Supreme Court
had never adopted the common law rule.56
A final argument disposed of by the court was that a lessor has
a right to realize the increased value of the leased property. 7 The
court rejected this argument and noted that a lessor who has alienated
the use and enjoyment of the leased property for consideration is en-
titled to no more than bargained for.58 Any increased value of the
property not provided for by the terms of the lease is returned to
the lessor upon the expiration of the lease when the lessor regains
an appreciated reversionary interest.5 9
2. The Dissent
The dissenting opinion embraced the arguments favoring the com-
mon law rule. Furthermore, the dissent was convinced by an addi-
tional argument not raised by the litigants, but suggested by the court
of appeal.6" This argument was that a universal reasonableness re-
quirement had been considered and rejected by the legislature when
sections 1951.2 and 1951.4 of the California Civil Code were enacted. 6'
The dissent pointed out that California Civil Code section 1951.262
provides a remedy for a lessor when the lessee breaches the lease by
either abandoning the property or by having the right to possession
55. Id. (citing Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 624, 517 P.2d 1168, 1173, 111
Cal. Rptr. 704, 709 (1974)).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 504, 709 P.2d at 847-48, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 829. "Tlhe landlord agreed to dispose
of possession for the limited term and he could not reasonably anticipate any more than what
was given to him by the terms of the lease." (quoting 4 MILLER & STARR, CURRENT LAW
OF CALIFORNIA REAL ESTATE § 27.93, at 321 (1984 Supp.).
59. Kendall, 40 Cal. 3d at 505, 709 P.2d at 848, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 829.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 507, 709 P.2d at 849, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 829.
62. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1951.2. Section 1951.2 provides in pertinent part:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in Section 1951.4, if a lessee of real property
breaches the lease and abandons the property before the end of the term or if his
right to possession is terminated by the lessor because of a breach of the lease, the
lease terminates. Upon such termination, the lessor may recover from the lessee:(1) The worth at the time of award of the unpaid rent which had been earned
at the time of termination;
(2) The worth at the time of award of the amount by which the unpaid rent which
would have been earned after termination until the time of award exceeds the amount
of such rental loss that the lessee proves could have been reasonably avoided;
(3) Subject to subdivision (c), the worth at the time of award of the amount by
which the unpaid rent for the balance of the term after the time of award exceeds
the amount of such rental loss that the lessee proves could be reasonably avoided; and
(4) Any other amount necessary to compensate the lessor for all the detriment
proximately caused by the lessee's failure to perform his obligations under the lease
or which in the ordinary course of things would be likely to result therefrom.
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terminated by the lessor before the expiration of the lease.63 A lessor
may recover the rents that would have become due had the lease con-
tinued until expiration." From this amount the lessor must subtract
the amount recovered or recoverable from reletting the property.6"
Section 1951.2 requires a lessor either to mitigate damages or accept
a lesser recovery. 66 The burden of proving avoidable loss is born by
the lessee who must prove that the lessor could have relet the
premises.67
Furthermore, the dissent noted that in 1970 the California Legislature
enacted section 1951.4 of the Civil Code. 61 Section 1951.4 allows a
lessor to avoid the statutory duty to mitigate damages by contracting
(c) The lessor may recover damages under paragraph (3) of subdivision (a) only if:
(1) The lease provides that the damages he may recover include the worth of the
time of award of the amount by which the unpaid rent for the balance of the term
after the time of award, or for any shorter period of time specified in the lease,
exceeds the amount of such rental loss for the same period that the lessee proves
could be reasonably avoided; or
(2) The lessor relet the property prior to the time of award and proves that in
reletting the property he acted reasonably and in a good-faith effort to mitigate the
damages, but the recovery of damages under this paragraph is subject to any limita-
tions specified in the lease.
(d) Efforts by the lessor to mitigate the damages caused by the lessee's breach
of the lease do not waive the lessor's right to recover damages under this section.
Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. California Law Revision Commission, Recommendation Relating to Real Property
Leases, 9 CAL. L. REVIsION COMM'N 153, 166 (1969) [Hereinafter cited as Recommendation].
For two recent cases interpreting § 1951.2, see California Safety Center, Inc. v. Jax Car Sales
of California, Inc., 164 Cal. App. 3d 992, 1000, 211 Cal. Rptr. 39, 44 (1985) (interpreting
phrase at the time of the award to mean at the time of judgment pursuant to the § 1951.2
action rather than the time of the prior unlawful detainer judgment); Sanders Constr. Co.
v. San Joaquin First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 136 Cal. App. 3d 387, 401, 186 Cal. Rptr.
218, 227 (1982) (factors to take into account when applying § 1951.2 in an action for breach
of contract). See also Comment, Landlord-Tenant Legislation: Revising an Old Common Law
Relationship, 2 PAC. L.J. 259 (1971).
68. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1951.4. Section 1951.4 provides in pertinent part:
(a) The remedy described in this section is available'only if the lease provides for
this remedy.
(b) Even though a lessee of real property has breached his lease and abandoned
the property, the lease continues in effect for so long as the lessor does not terminate
the lessee's right to possession, and the lessor may enforce all his rights and remedies
under the lease, including the right to recover the rent as it becomes due under the
lease, if the lease permits the lessee to do any of the following:
(1) Sublet the property, assign his interest in the lease, or both.
(2) Sublet the property, assign his interest in the lease, or both, subject to stan-
dards or conditions, and the lessor does not require compliance with any unreasonable
standard for, nor any unreasonable condition on, such subletting or assignment.
(3) Sublet the property, assign his interest in the lease, or both, with the consent
of the lessor, and the lease provides that such consent shall not unreasonably be
withheld.
Id.
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to shift that duty to the lessee.69 Section 1951.4 permits a lessor to
continue to collect the rent as it becomes due, irrespective of poten-
tial reletting, if the lessor has not terminated the lessee's right of posses-
sion.70 To take advantage of 1951.4, however, the lease must provide
that the lessee may sublease or assign the lease.7 The right to assign
or sublet can either be subject to the lessor's consent or conditioned
on expressed standards. The only limitation is that consent not be
unreasonably withheld7" and that the standards are reasonable."
The dissent argued that by enacting Civil Code sections 1951.2 and
1951.4, the legislature considered the position of lessors who desire
the right to unreasonably withhold consent.74 The cost of an absolute
right to withhold consent is the loss of the remedy outlined in section
1951.4." Therefore, a lessor contracting for absolute discretion would
have to mitigate damages pursuant to section 1951.2.
The majority admitted that section 1951.4 implicitly recognizes that,
absent a reasonableness clause, a lessor might believe a right to ar-
bitrarily withhold consent exists.7 6 Nevertheless, the majority responded
that implicit recognition of a common law rule does not codify that
rule.77 Thus, the majority found that the decision would not frustrate
the legislative purpose of Civil Code Sections 1951.2 and 1951.4.7
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The common law rule permitting a lessor to withhold consent to
69. Kendall, 40 Cal. 3d at 510, 709 P.2d at 852, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 833 (Lucas, J., dissent-
ing) (quoting Kendall v. Ernest Pestana, Inc., 163 Cal. App. 3d 11, 17, 209 Cal. Rptr. 135,
138 (1984)); see also, Recommendation, supra note 67, at 168-69 (1969).
70. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1951.4.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Kendall, 40 Cal. 3d at 510, 709 P.2d at 852, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 833 (Lucas, J., dissent-
ing) (quoting Kendall v. Ernst Pestana, Inc. 163 Cal. App. 3d 11, 17, 209 Cal. Rptr. 135,
138 (1984)). The Court stated:
Thus, the California Legislature has considered the situation of lessors contracting
for the right (and then exercising it) of unreasonably withholding consent to an assign-
ment. That it has provided an increased measure of damages (and thus an incentive)
to those who forego this right is a clear recognition that this contractual right does exist.
Id.
75. Id. See also Recommendation, supra note 67, at 168-69 (1969).
76. Kendall, 40 Cal. 3d at 506, 709 P.2d at 849, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 830. "[S]ection 1951.4
impliedly recognizes that absent a 'reasonableness' clause, a lessor might believe that he or
she had a common law right arbitrarily to withhold consent to assignment, and thus frustrate
the statutory scheme." Id. How this belief frustrates the statutory scheme was not articulated.
The loss of a lessor's 1951.4 remedy occasioned by omitting a reasonableness clause would
seem to carry forth the intent of the statute.
77. Kendall, 40 Cal. 3d at 506, 709 P.2d at 849, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 830.
78. Id. at 506-07, 709 P.2d at 848-49, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 830.
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transfer leased property developed during the feudal period of English
history." ' The common law rule first was applied in California in
Richard v. Degen & Brody, Inc.80 Richard concerned a lease that pro-
vided that any assignment or sublet without written consent of the
lessor was voidable by the lessor.8' The court found that the lessee
sublet a portion of the premises without the consent of the lessor."2
The lessor brought suit after the new tenant had taken possession
and established a business not in conformance with the lease.8 3 Rely-
ing upon the traditional common law view, the court held the lessee
had no remedy against the lessor for his refusal to consent."
The Kendall court noted that Richard has not been cited often in
support of the common law rule."5 The rule has since been expressly
rejected by the same court of appeal that had decided Richard more
than two decades earlier.86 In Cohen v. Ratinoff,87 the lessee, a seller
of carpets and drapes, entered into a lease requiring the written con-
sent of the lessor to any lease or assignment. 8 The lessee contracted
to sell his business and the remainder of his lease to another carpet
company. 9 Following the lessor's refusal to consent to the assign-
ment, the proposed assignee terminated the purchase agreement. 90 The
79. Laguna Royale Owners Ass'n v. Darger, 119 Cal. App. 3d 670, 681, 174 Cal. Rptr.
136, 143 (1981) (condominium association must reasonably exercise power to approve or disap-
prove transfers, withholding approval only for reasons relating to the protection, preservation
and operation of the property). See also Comment, The Approval Clause in a Lease: Toward
a Standard of Reasonableness, 17 U.S.F.L. REv. 681 (1983).
80. 181 Cal. App. 2d 289, 5 Cal. Rptr. 263 (1960).
81. Id. at 292, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 265.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 299, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 269.
85. Kendall, 40 Cal. 3d at 496, 709 P.2d at 842, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 823. The majority
noted that Richard was neither followed nor cited to support the common law rule until 1981.
However, other commentators advised of the authority of Richard as law. See M. DEAN, F.
NICHOLAS & R. CAPLAN, COMMERCIAL REAL PROPERTY LEASE PRACTICE 159 (1976) ("A tenant
should insist that the landlord agree not to unreasonably withhold its consent to a proposed"
assignment, encumbrance, or subletting, and most landlords agree to such a clause. Without
such an agreement the landlord can arbitrarily withhold its consent or attach conditions to
the granting of its consent, and the tenant is without recourse.") (citing Richard v. Degen
& Brody, Inc., 181 Cal. App. 2d 289, 5 Cal. Rptr. 263 (1960)). M. DEAN, F. NICHOLAS &
R. CAPLAN, supra, § 3110, at 159; MILLER & STARR, supra note 58, § 27.92, at 416 ("A landlord
is under no duty to give his consent to an assignment or sublease. In absence of a lease provi-
sion that his consent will not be unreasonably withheld, the landlord may arbitrarily withhold
his consent.") (citing Richard v. Degen & Brody, Inc., 181 Cal. App. 2d 289, 5 Cal. Rptr.
263 (1960)).
86. The Court of Appeal for the Second District decided both Richard and Cohen v.
Ratinoff, 147 Cal. App. 3d 321, 195 Cal. Rptr. 84 (1983).
87. 147 Cal. App. 3d 321, 195 Cal. Rptr. 84 (1983).
88. Id. at 324-25, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 85.
89. Id. at 325, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 86.
90. Id.
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court of appeal held that the lessee could recover for breach of con-
tract and bad faith breach of contract for the lessor's wrongful refusal
to consent. 9' The Cohen court cited the implied duty of good faith
and fair dealing as well as the policy against restraints on alienation
in support of the holding.92 Shortly after Cohen, two additional cases
adopted the rule formulated in Cohen.93
The California Court of Appeal for the Fourth District refused to
discard the common law rule in Hamilton v. Dixon.9 In Hamilton
a lease was entered into sixteen years earlier when the common law
rule allowed the lessor to withhold consent for any or no reason.95
The court noted the tacit approval by the legislature of the right to
withhold consent arbitrarily in California Civil Code sections 1951.2
and 1951.4. 96 Therefore, the court viewed the legislation as expressly
recognizing the right of lessors to bargain for the ability to withhold
consent arbitrarily. 9" The court concluded that any abrogation of this
right should come from the legislature and not the courts.9"
III. LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS
A few California appellate courts recently adopted a reasonableness
requirement concerning assignments.99 The California Supreme Court
has affirmed these holdings in Kendall. The tension between the dual
nature of a lease as a conveyance of a leasehold interest and as a
91. Id. at 328, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 89.
92. Id.
93. Schweiso v. Williams, 150 Cal. App. 3d 883, 886, 198 Cal. Rptr. 238, 240 (1984)
(lessor's attempt to extract "blood money" from lessee pursuant to approval clause presented
triable issue of fact regarding reasonableness of withholding consent); Prestin v. Mobil Oil
Corp., 741 F.2d 268, 271 (9th Cir. 1984) (applying California law, triable issue of fact existed
whether franchisor unreasonably withheld consent to assignment, thereby breaching implied
duty of good faith and fair dealing).
94. 168 Cal. App. 3d 1004, 214 Cal. Rptr. 639 (1985). Hamilton involved the plight of
elderly widow Thelma Dixon. Id. at 1008, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 643. Thelma and her husband,
acting as lessors, entered into a 24-year commercial lease for a monthly rental of $375 for
the entire term. This rent plus a $259 monthly social security payment represented her only
income. The lessee would have been required to pay $53,200 for the remainder of the term.
Id. The tenant subleased the property without written consent required by the lease. The tenant
expected to receive $331,800 from the subtenant. Thelma terminated the lease in response to
the lessee's unconsented sublease. Id. at 1006, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 641.
95. "The master lease was signed in 1970 when Richard was clearly the law and the provi-
sion was indisputably enforceable. The legal mutations which created the new species called
implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing were mere spores in the halls of ivy then."
Hamilton, 168 Cal. App. 3d at 1010, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 642.
96. Hamilton, 168 Cal. App. at 1010-11, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 642-43.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1011, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 643.
99. See Schweiso v. Williams, 150 Cal. App. 3d 883, 886, 198 Cal. Rptr. 238, 240 (1984)
(lessor may refuse consent based only on good faith reasonable objection); Prestin v. Mobil
Oil Corp., 741 F.2d 268, 271 (9th cir. 1984) (good faith reasonable objection required to refuse
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contract has long been recognized in California.' °0 The common law,
while abhoring restraints on alienation, nonetheless viewed restraints
upon transfers of leaseholds as subordinate to the absolute owner-
ship of the lessor.'' Likewise, the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing implied in contracts is a well established principle in Califor-
nia law.'0 2 Nevertheless, the application of these recognized legal prin-
ciples to assignment clauses in commercial leases poses some
uncertainties.
A. The Standard of Reasonableness
California law now requires that when consent is necessary to assign
a commercial lease, a lessor may not unreasonably withhold consent." 3
Whether a lessor's refusal to consent was reasonable is a question
of fact.0 4 Some of the factors the trier of fact may consider in ap-
plying the standards of commercial reasonableness are: Financial
responsibility of the proposed assignee;'0 5 suitability of the use for
consent to assignment or sublet); Cohen v. Ratinoff, 147 Cal. App. 3d 321, 330, 195 Cal.
Rptr. 84, 89 (1983) (good faith reasonable objection required of lessor to refuse consent to
assign or sublet); see also, Sade Shoe Co. v. Oschin & Snyder, 162 Cal. App. 3d 1174, 1179,
209 Cal. Rptr. 124, 126 (1984) (refusal to consent may result in intentional interference with
prospective economic advantage); Laguna Royale Owners Ass'n v. Darger, 119 Cal. App. 3d
670, 682, 174 Cal. Rptr. 136, 143 (1981) (condominium association must act reasonably in
approving or disapproving transfers; Richard distinguished); Richardson v. La Rancherita La
Jolla, Inc., 98 Cal. App. 3d 73, 82, 159 Cal. Rptr. 285, 290 (1979) (lessor's withholding con-
sent was tortious interference with contract). But see Hamilton v. Dixon, 168 Cal. App. 3d
1004, 214 Cal. Rptr. 639, 642 (1985) (common law rule valid where lease entered into when
Richard was clearly enforceable); Thrifty Oil Co. v. A. Batarse, 174 Cal. App. 3d 770, 776,
220 Cal. Rptr. 285, 289 (1985) (lessees failure to request lessor's approval to assignment con-
stituted breach irrespective of status of common law rule).
100. California Civil Code § 1925 recognizes a lease as a contract. "Hiring is a contract
by which one gives to another the temporary possession and use of property, other than money
for reward, and the latter agrees to return the same to the former at a future time." CAL.
Cwv. CODE § 1925. The courts have traditionally viewed a lease as both conveyance and con-
tract. See Medico-Dental Bldg. Co. v. Horton & Converse, 21 Cal. 2d 411, 418, 132 P.2d
457, 462 (1942) ("While it is true that a lease is primarily a conveyance . . . it also presents
the aspect of a contract.") Id. at 418, 132 P.2d at 462. See also Recommendation, supra note
67, at 158 (1969); Comment, supra note 79, at 259.
101. 2 POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 246(l), at 372.97 (1985).
102. See Universal Sales Corp., Ltd. v. California Press Mfg. Co., 20 Cal. 2d 751, 771,
128 P.2d 665, 677 (1942) ("In every contract there is an implied covenant that neither party
shall do anything which will have the effect of destroying or injuring the right of the other
party to receive the fruits of the contract, which means that in every contract there exists an
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing."); California Lettuce Growers v. Union Sugar
Co., 45 Cal. 2d 474, 484, 289 P.2d 785, 791 (1955) ("[W]here a contract confers on one party
a discretionary power affecting the rights of the other, a duty is imposed to exercise that discretion
in good faith and in accordance with fair dealing.").
103. Kendall, 40 Cal. 3d at 507, 709 P.2d at 849, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 830.
104. Id. at 501, 709 P.2d at 845, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 826.
105. Id. See generally Comment, supra note 79, at 697-98.
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the particular property; °" legality of the proposed use; 07 need for
alteration of the premises;' and the nature of the occupancy.'0 9 De-
nying consent solely on the basis of personal taste, convenience, or
sensibility is not commercially reasonable."10 In addition, courts will
not consider a denial of consent reasonable if the purpose of the denial
is to allow the lessor to increase rent."'
The extent to which the reasonableness requirement will increase
litigation is unknown. Many commercial leases contain reasonableness
clauses principally to allow the lessor to elect between the remedies
afforded by Civil Code sections 1951.2 and 1951.4.112 Thus, the issue
of reasonableness is currently triable when provided for in the lease.
Furthermore, even under the common law rule, aggrieved lessees could
gain access to the courts under the doctrines of waiver and estop-
pel." 3 Nevertheless, gray areas exist regarding the reasonableness of
lessor justifications for refusal to consent." 4 Lessors will predicate
their denial of consent to assignment on safe harbors recognized by
the court as reasonable objections." ' Tenants will contest these
justifications by marshaling evidence of unreasonable intent." 6 More
106. Kendall, 40 Cal. 3d at 501, 709 P.2d at 845, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 826. See generally
Comment, supra note 79, at 697-98.
107. Kendall, 40 Cal. 3d at 501, 709 P.2d at 845, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 826. See generally
Comment, supra note 79, at 697-98.
108. Kendall, 40 Cal. 3d at 501, 709 P.2d at 845, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 826. See generally
Comment, supra note 79, at 697-98.
109. Kendall, 40 Cal. 3d at 501, 709 P.2d at 845, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 826. See generally
Comment, supra note 79, at 697-98.
110. Kendall, 40 Cal. 3d at 501, 709 P.2d at 845, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 826. See generally
Comment, supra note 79, at 697-98.
111. Kendall, 40 Cal. 3d at 501, 709 P.2d at 845, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 826. See generally
Comment, supra note 79, at 697-98. Many existing leases contain clauses which provide that
the lessor recover the overage from a lessee who subleases or assigns the premises for more
than the lessee formerly paid as rent. The majority affirmed the principle that parties to com-
mercial leases can contract to allocate appreciated rentals subsequent to a transfer of the leasehold.
Kendall, 40 Cal. 3d at 505 n.17, 709 P.2d at 848 n.17, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 829 n.17.
112. See, e.g., M. DEAN, F. NICHOLAS & R. CAPLAN, supra note 85, at 159; Recommenda-
tion, supra note 67, at 169 (1969).
113. Kendall, 40 Cal. 3d at 495, 709 P.2d at 841, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 822. See Kern Sunset
Oil Co. v. Good Rds. Oil Co., 214 Cal. 435, 6 P.2d 71, 73-4 (1931) (breach of lease waived
by lessor's acceptance of oil well royalty payments); Buchanan v. Banta, 204 Cal. 73, 76, 266
P. 547, 548 (1928) (lessor's acceptance of rent with full knowledge of transfer and without
protest precluded forfeiture or breach of lease); Randol v. Tatum, 98 Cal. 390, 397, 33 P.
433, 435 (1893) (lessor's acceptance of rent with knowledge of assignment constituted waiver
of consent provision); Sexton v. Nelson, 228 Cal. App. 248, 258, 39 Cal. Rptr. 407, 413 (1964)
(lessor electing to impose forfeiture for unauthorized assignment must give notice of his inten-
tion in the premises); see also CAL. CiV. CODE § 1179 (allowing court to relieve tenant from
a forfeiture of lease if hardship demonstrated under circumstances).
114. See generally Comment, supra note 79, at 694-98.
115. See supra notes 104-11 and accompanying text.
116. See id.
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specific guidelines determining what constitutes a commercially
reasonable objection awaits refinement by courts applying Kendall.
B. Effect on Existing Leases
The most perplexing aspect of Kendall concerns the application of
Civil Code section 1951.4 to existing leases written without
reasonableness provisions. The lease in Kendall required the approval
of the lessor before assignment. No language in the approval clause
limited the discretion of the lessor. ' 7 The court in Kendall sup-
plemented the lease with language requiring a commercially reasonable
objection in order to withhold consent."' The question then arises
whether lessors of similarly drafted leases will now be afforded the
remedy provided in Civil Code section 1951.4. Formerly a consent
clause without a reasonableness clause foreclosed the lessor from elect-
ing to hold the lessee to the lease since the lease did not meet the
requirements of the section.' Kendall arguably makes the 1951.4
remedy available in all commercial leases subject to the implied
reasonablenss requirement.' 2 °
The determination of this issue bears significantly upon the rights
of lessors and lessees under existing leases. If the lessee is solvent
and the lessor does not have the desire, facilities, or ability to either
manage the property or acquire a suitable tenant, section 1951.4
becomes an important remedy.' 2 ' Parties to existing leases were not
likely to have bargained for or contemplated the provisions of this
remedy when applied to leases not containing reasonableness clauses.
The dilemma facing courts applying Kendall will be to decide whether
to deny a lessor section 1951.4 relief although the terms of the lease,
as interpreted by the court in Kendall, qualify for the remedy.
C. Prospective Effect
After Kendall, leases could include a reasonableness clause, expressly
117. Paragraph 13 of the sublease in Kendall reads in pertinent part: "Lessee shall not
assign this lease . . . or suffer any other person to occupy or use said premises, or any portion
thereof, without written consent of lessor first had and obtained ....... Kendall, 40 Cal.
3d at 494 n.5, 709 P.2d at 840 n.5, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 821 n.5.
118. Kendall, 40 Cal. 3d at 508, 709 P.2d at 850, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 831 (Lucas, J., dissenting).
119. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
120. CAL. Crv. CODE § 1951.4. Section 1951.4 requires that the lease provide for the remedy.
Id. The California Supreme Court hinted that an implied-by-law reasonableness requirement
will not meet the requirements of the provision as "[t]he lease must expressly state that such
consent will not be unreasonably withheld." Kendall, 40 Cal. 3d at 506, 709 P.2d at 849,
220 Cal. Rptr. at 830 (emphasis added).
121. See Recommendation, supra note 67, at 168 (1969). See, e.g., Cockran, Recovery Based
on Future Rent After Lessee's Breach, 44 L.A. B. BULL. 199, 228-29 (1969).
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prohibit all assignment, or covenant for the right to arbitrarily and
capriciously withhold consent.'22 The effect Kendall will have on clauses
prohibiting any assignment or reserving absolute discretion is uncer-
tain.'23 A footnote in Kendall pointed out that the issue was not con-
sidered by the court because the lease did not provide for an ab-
solute prohibition.'24 Reference to a reasonbleness clause in Califor-
nia Civil Code section 1951.4 evidences the intent of the legislature
to provide parties with an election of remedies.' 23 Had no difference
been intended between Civil Code sections 1951.2 and 1951.4, the
legislature would have made both remedies applicable to all leases
without reference to a reasonableness requirement.'26 If the court were
to strike down absolute prohibitions on assignments, or prohibit
covenanting for the right of the lessor to withhold consent for any
reason, no advantage would exist for leases drafted without
reasonableness clauses. Conceivably these leases could be subject to
a reasonableness requirement, yet the leases would not be entitled to
the California Civil Code section 1951.4 remedy.' 21
D. Recommendation
California Civil Code section 1952.2 renders the provisions of Civil
Code sections 1951.2 and 1951.4 inapplicable to any lease executed
before July 1, 1971128 or later leases the terms of which were fixed
before July 1, 1971.P29 The section applies prospectively to ensure that
leases negotiated without knowledge of the Civil Code sections are
122. The lease in Kendall was silent concerning any limitations on the lessor's discretion
to withhold consent. A question remains if contracting for the right to withhold consent ar-
bitrarily will be allowed. Such a provision could be struck down as an unacceptable restraint
on alienation, or as contrary to public policy. A narrow reading of the holding in Kendall
would not disturb such provisions; however, the tenor of the opinion is hostile to restrictive
covenants in commercial lease assignment clauses.
123. An absolute prohibition of assignment might be contemplated by a lessor desiring the
continued identification or presence of a particular lessee. Restrictive use provisions may per-
form a similar function. See generally M. DEAN, F. NIcHoL.As & R. CAPLAN, supra note 85,
§§ 3.58, 3.110, at 104, 108.
124. Footnote 14 reads: "This case does not present the question of the validity of a clause
absolutely prohibiting assignment, or granting absolute discretion over assignment to the lessor.
We note that under the Restatement rule such a provision would be valid if freely negotiated."
Kendall, 40 Cal. 3d at 500 n.14, 709 P.2d at 844 n.14, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 825 n.14.
125. Recommendation, supra note 67, at 157-69 (1969).
126. Id. See supra notes 61-75 and accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 68-75 and accompanying text.
128. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1952.2. Section 1952.2 reads: "Sections 1951 to 1952, inclusive,
do not apply to: (a) Any lease executed before July 1, 1971. (b) Any lease executed on or
after July 1, 1971, if the terms of the lease, option, or other agreement executed before July
1, 1971." Id.
129. Id.
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not affected.'30 The lease at issue in Kendall was entered into on
January 1, 1970.'13 In Kendall no problem is presented by reliance
of the parties on the California Civil Code remedy scheme since the
lease predates the enactment of the legislation.' 32 Parties to leases
entered into after July 1, 1971, however, relied not solely on the com-
mon law rule applied in Richard, but on the statutory remedies as
well. The expectations of these parties should not be displaced by
the court's most recent recognition of modem contract principles. Many
parties relied upon legislative recognition of these same contract prin-
ciples embodied in Civil Code sections 1951.2 and 1951.4. ' 33 Therefore,
the holding of Kendall should be confined to those leases entered in-
to before July 1, 1971. Kendall should also be applied prospectively
to leases that are silent regarding the discretion of lessors to withhold
consent. Application of Kendall in such a manner preserves the con-
cept of a meaningful election of remedies intended by the legislature.'
34
CONCLUSION
California now joins a minority of states requiring a commercially
reasonable objection as a basis for withholding consent to an assign-
ment of a lease. The underlying reasons for adopting the reasonableness
requirement include the interest in the free alienation of property and
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Concern for the
protection of lessor's reversionary interest is secured by allowing
reasonable objections to a proposed assignee.
The majority in Kendall, however, did not adequately consider the
statutory remedies provided in California Civil Code sections 1951.2
and 1951.4. The Kendall opinion is difficult to reconcile with the
distinctions set forth in the Civil Code and with the legislative intent
to provide an election of remedies in the event of breach or aban-
130. Recommendation, supra note 67, at 163 (1969).
131. Kendall, 40 Cal. App. 3d at 493, 709 P.2d at 839, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 820.
132. Id.
133. Recommendation, supra note 67, at 158 (1969). The Committee Report reads in perti-
nent part:
Section 1925 of the Civil Code provides that a lease is a contract. Historically,
however, a lease of real property has been regarded as a conveyance of an interest
in land . . . The California courts state that a lease is both a contract and a con-
veyance and apply a mixture of contract and property principles to lease cases. This
mixture, however, is generally unsatisfactory. ... [The Act] would provide the lessor
with a reasonable choice of remedies comparable to that available to the promisee
when the promisor has breached a contract.
Id. at 157-58. See also supra note 100 and accompanying text.
134. See supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text.
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donment. The effect of implying a reasonableness standard into a
lease was not discussed by the court. One possible result would be
to permit the lessor to elect remedies, a choice formerly unavailable
to lessors in the absence of a reasonableness clause in the lease. A
more likely result would be to hold the lessor to the remedy outlined
in Civil Code sectiona 1951.2.
To avoid this dilemma, the holding of Kendall should apply only
to those leases entered into before the enactment of the Civil Code
provisions. The rule would also operate prospectively to leases which
require lessor consent, but do not qualify in any way the discretion
of the lessor to withhold consent. The policies contemplated by Ken-
dall would be advanced without unsettling the expectations of existing
leases or hampering the operation of the California Civil Code
remedies.
Greg Block
